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Reference pricing v co-payment: Firms’ pricing strategies 
Abstract 
 
Within a horizontally differentiation model and allowing for heterogeneous qualities, we analyze the 
effects of reference pricing reimbursement on firms’ pricing strategies. With this analysis we find 
inherent incentives for firms’ pricing behaviour, and consequently we shed some light on time 
consistency of such policy. The analysis encompasses different reference price rules. Results show 
that if drugs have equal quality, reference pricing may lead to higher prices. With quality differentiation 
both the minimum and linear policies unambiguously lead to higher prices. 
 
 
1 Introduction
Expenditure in pharmaceuticals is one of the major factors behind the growth
of the total expenditure on health care in OECD countries. Indeed, in most
countries it represents a share between 10 and 20% of total costs (Mossialos and
Le Grand 2002), being this weight bigger in low income countries. Furthermore,
during the 1990s the rate of growth of expenditure in pharmaceuticals, both to-
tal and per capita, was higher than both the rate of growth of inßation and
the rate of growth of total health care costs (Mossialos 2002). Since in most
countries these expenses are borne publicly (Mossialos 2002) they have been
one of the main targets of public policy. Namely, through the launch of regula-
tion policies, competition incentives, reimbursement schemes, antitrust policies,
among others. Despite being targeted to aect dierent sides of the market, the
goal of these policies tends to be unique: the control of (public) pharmaceutical
expenditure policies either through quantity control (demand side measures)
or through price control (supply side measures). In publicly funded systems,
drug costs are borne either through public insurance schemes (e.g. Belgium)
or through direct discount on the market price. Traditionally, consumers have
always paid a proportion of the total price  co-payment - while the remaining
was borne by the third party payer. This partial accountability for drug costs
is on the basis of moral hazard problems, by which, there exists (non optimal)
over consumption of prescription drugs. Associated with the moral hazard prob-
lem, this reimbursement tool is also believed to be quite limited in providing
competition incentives as well as exposes consumers to risks by limiting the
risk-spreading feature of health insurance. These drawbacks, namely the Þrst
two, lead policy makers either to abandon or complement this reimbursement
system. It has been in this context that policies such as reimbursement ceilings,
special schemes for the reimbursement of orphan drugs and reference pricing
policies were born.
This paper focus on the analysis of the impact of reference pricing policy on
Þrms pricing strategies by considering two dierent reference pricing rules and
a scenario where drugs quality might dier.
Reference Pricing (RP) is a regulatory mechanism consisting of clustering
drugs according to some equivalence criteria (chemical, pharmacological or ther-
apeutic) and deÞning a reference price for each cluster. The third party payer,
then, will just reimburse not more than that price for each drug on that cluster.
If a consumer buys a drug with price lower or equal to the reference price of
that cluster, then the co-payment he faces is null. Otherwise, if the drug bought
is priced higher than the reference price, the consumer will bear, fully or partly,
the dierence between the reference price and the drug price.
Even though its formulation varies from country to country, reference pricing
is generally seen as an e!cient mechanism in cutting drug prices by encourag-
ing self restraint, in controlling relative demand of highly priced drugs and in
encouraging the appropriate use of drugs. Based on this premises, third party
payers pharmaceutical expenditure would be controlled.
However, the eectiveness of this mechanism ultimately depends on its abil-
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ity in enhancing competition in the drug market and on the promotion of Þnan-
cial responsibility by consumers and pharmaceutical Þrms. Indeed, competition
enhancement has been often pointed as the rationale for the implementation
of such policy (Lopez-Casasnovas and Jonsson 2001; Ma 1994). Based on the
premise that competition in the pharmaceutical market is insu!cient due to pa-
tients and prescribers weak information and/or insensitivity to prices, reference
pricing is believed to increase demand sensitivity to prices and hence promote
competition. Indeed, by making patients liable for the extra drug cost above
reference pricing, the latter creates incentives for the substitution between close
substitutes and consequently enhances price competition. Nevertheless, being a
demand side measure, Þrms behavior is only inßuenced indirectly via demand
eects. Indeed, under this policy, Þrms can freely set their prices. Moreover,
despite the heterogeneity of the reference pricing rules in the dierent coun-
tries, conceptually they share the same feature of being based on Þrms pricing
strategies. On the top of the non optimality issues that may arise with this for-
mulation, one should add the incentives that proÞt maximizing rational Þrms
to reformulate their pricing strategies in order to achieve higher proÞts. In fact,
by accounting for the fact that each period the reference pricing level will be
calculated having as basis observed prices in the previous period, Þrms will have
an incentive to price at higher levels than they would in the absence of reference
pricing. If this hypothesis is veriÞed then the reference pricing implementation
rationale of competition enhancement is seriously at danger. Consequently, we
do Þnd of extreme importance the analysis of Þrms pricing strategies, under the
implementation of reference pricing policies, not only because pharmaceutical
Þrms (tacit) pricing behavior might compromise the endeavour of cost contain-
ment of this policy, but also its perverse consequences under a competition policy
context. The aim of this article is to analyze whether reference pricing policies
facilitate higher prices allowing Þrms to exert market power and consequently
restrict competition and increase prices.
Even though the existing literature on Reference Pricing has been mainly
empirical, some authors have contributed to the analysis through the develop-
ment of theoretical frameworks (Danzon and Chao 2000; Danzon and Liu 1996;
Merino-Castelló 2003; Mestre-Ferrandiz 2001; Morton 1999). Among these stud-
ies, two deserve special attention given their proximity to the model we aim at
developing. In the work by Mestre-Ferrandiz (2001), the author compares the
impact of a reference price and a co-payment system in pharmaceutical market
with generic competition. Using a horizontal dierentiated model where two
Þrms compete á la Bertrand, the author concludes that, just for some reference
price level, a reference pricing policy can control pharmaceutical expenditure
and reduce drug prices. Merino-Castelló (2003), studies the impact of Refer-
ence Pricing on the price setting strategies of pharmaceutical Þrms (generic
and branded) on a vertical product dierentiated model. The author concludes
that reference pricing is indeed eective in enhancing price competition as, after
reference pricing had been implemented, branded prices decrease while generic
prices remain constant. Nevertheless, this price competition increases the usage
of branded drugs in detriment of generics.
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The study of pricing behavior is not fully contemplated in the above men-
tioned articles. Even though the analysis by Merino-Castelló andMestre-Ferrandiz
focus on the impact of reference pricing on Þrms pricing strategies, the simplify-
ing assumptions of their set ups do not allow to conclude on this matter. Indeed,
our analysis diers from the two above mentioned contributions primarily on
the envisaged purpose and, secondly, on the framework used. In eect, in our
analysis we study explicit reference pricing formulations as well as consider a
dierent timing of implementation of the policy in order to better Þt reality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of
the framework. Section 3 presents the equilibrium of the game for the dierent
reference pricing strategies. Section 4 introduces vertical product dierentiation.
Finally we discuss the results and conclude on sections 5 and 6, respectively.
2 The model
Consider a market with two pharmaceutical Þrms, indexed 1 and 2, and a con-
tinuum of consumers. Drugs are horizontally-dierentiated being located in an
unidimensional characteristics space in an unit interval [0> 1] (in the spirit of
Hotelling (1929)). Each Þrm l for l = 1> 2 then, produces a distinct variety of
drug at an identical and constant marginal cost f, which (for the sake of sim-
plicity) is standardized to zero: Þrm 1 produces drug {1 and Þrm 2 produces
drug {2. As the strategic location game is not modelled here, the drug vari-
eties will be considered as exogenously given, and we will assume, without loss
of generality, that Þrm 2s variety is located at the right of Þrm 1s one, i.e.,
{2 A {1.
We analyze a Þnite dynamic game, in which duopolists compete by non-
cooperatively setting prices in two subsequent periods: let sl>w be the price
charged by Þrm l at period w , with l = 1> 2 and w = 1> 2. Each Þrm chooses
strategies in any period to maximize its own proÞt function l for l = 1> 2.
Consumers dier on their tastes for drugs. Each consumer is assumed to
have a most preferred drug } 5 [0> 1] that is given by her location on the line
segment. We assume a mass of consumers standardized to one and uniformly
distributed along the unit interval. Consumers are endowed with a Þnite instant
utility from treatment n equal across all the individuals.
We Þrst describe the two-stage game where no public regulation is in force.
The game is genuinely repeated, in that, in both stages, Þrms compete by
setting simultaneously and non-cooperatively prices which are only aecting
their payos in that period. The Þnite game will then be solved backwards
by looking at the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. We then characterize the
dynamic game when reference pricing is introduced by the regulator.
2.1 Demand
For the moment, assume patients are not reimbursed through a reference pricing
policy, thus bearing all the cost of bought drugs. However, in order to fully
3
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capture the consumers behavior in the pharmaceutical markets, we do not
force all the patients to consume one variety of drug, i.e., there are possible
non-buyers1 . In fact, given preferences, drug varieties and prices, consumers
decide whether to buy one unit of drug 1, one unit of drug 2 or whether not
buy any drug at all.
We assume that, when a consumer does not buy any of the drugs, her utility
is X (}; 0) = 0. On the other hand, the utility derived by a consumer located at
} 5 [0> 1] from buying drug l = 1> 2 is given by
X = n  sl  w |}  {l|
where we set the constant marginal cost of distance w equal to 1 so that |}  {l|
is the loss in utility incurred by a consumer located at } consuming drug {l at
price sl.
Parameter n represents consumers instant utility from treatment, equal
across patients, and measures the common willingness to pay for any unit of
a drug. One can think of it either as the maximum amount a consumer will
pay for a drug when deciding between two dierent treatments or as the main
improvement in health status from consuming the pharmaceutical treatment.
The instant utility from treatment allows our analysis to account for dier-
ent structures, as, depending on the value of n, the market will be partly or fully
covered. Intuitively, (a) for su!ciently high levels of the instant utility parame-
ter, all the consumers buy some variety of the dierentiated drug and, therefore,
the market results being fully covered. On the other hand, (b) for intermediate
levels of the instant utility parameter, consumers located at the edges of the
market may not consume any of the drug varieties. Finally, (c) for su!ciently
low levels of the instant utility parameter, consumers whose preferred drug va-
rieties are located towards the centre of the market might also be better o by
not buying any drug. In this case Þrms behave as local monopolists, selling only
in their neighbourhood.
The above market conÞgurations can be represented by the following dia-
grams,
1This feature was Þrst intoduced in horizontally diferentiated models by Economides
(1986). The modeling of this feature follows closely his set-up.
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Figure 1: Market structures
Formally, denote } as the location of the consumer who is indierent be-
tween buying the drug produced by Þrm 1 and the one produced by Þrm 2.
Furthermore, let }1 be the location of the consumer indierent between buying
drug 1 or not buying any of the existing drug varieties in the market, and }4
the consumer indierent between buying drug 2 or not buying anything.
As patients derive disutility as measured by the distance between their most
preferred drug and the drug they eventually buy, for all the consumers location
such that } 5 [0> }1[, it holds that X(};{2) ? X(};{1) ? X(}; 0): a consumer
located at } 5 [0> }1[ is better o by not buying a drug than buying any. On the
other hand, for all the consumers whose location are in the interval } 5 ]}1> }[,
we have that X(}; 0) ? X(};{2) ? X(};{1): consumers located in the range
} 5 ]}1> }[ prefer buying Þrms 1 drug than buying drug 2 or than not buying
any drug at all. Equivalently, for } 5 ]}> }4[, as X(};{1) ? X(}; 0) ? X(};{2),
consumers obtain a higher utility from buying drug variety 2 than buying from
1 or no drug at all. Finally, also all the consumers located in the segment
} 5 ]}4> 1], are better o by not buying any drug at all: X(};{1) ? X(};{2) ?
X(}; 0).
Therefore, the locations of the marginal customers }1, }4 and of }, the one in-
dierent among two varieties, are the solutions of X(}; 0) = X(};{1), X(};{2) =
X(}; 0) and X(};{1) = X(};{2) respectively:
}1 = s1 + {1  n (1)
} = (s2  s1) + ({1 + {2)
2
(2)
}4 = n + {2  s2 (3)
As each consumer demands just one unit of drug, total demand is given by
G =
}4wZ
}1w
i (}) g} with G1 =
}wZ
}1w
i (}) g} being served by Þrm 1 and the remaining
G2 =
}4wZ
}w
i (}) g} consumers by Þrm 2.
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With } uniformly distributed on the support [0> 1] Þrms demands in period
w are then given by,
G1>w = }w  }1w =
s
2>w  3s1>w + {2>w  {1>w + 2n
2
(4)
G2>w = }4w  }w =
s1>w  3s2>w + {2>w  {1>w + 2n
2
(5)
Thus, whenever }1 A 0 and }4 ? 1, the model in fact describes the case
where the instant utility from treatment n takes intermediate values of n and
the consumers at the edges of the market choose to not buy any of the drug
varieties. In this paper we will focus on this case only, referring to it as the
competitive scenario.
2.2 Equilibrium
Being the model a game of perfect information with sequential stages of simulta-
neous moves, the relevant solution concept for the game is clearly the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
In particular, Þniteness in the number of stages allows us to proceed by
backward induction. First, we will look for the equilibrium price conÞgurations
in the second and last period, then, we will solve for the mutually optimal
prices in the Þrst stage, and we will describe the equilibrium price strategies
of the overall game. For simplicity, in the analysis we will only focus on pure
strategies Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Given the demand functions as deÞned on (4) and (5), we observe from a
comparative statics analysis that in any period, Þrms demand is increasing on
the rivals price and decreasing in its own price. Indeed,
CG1>w
Cs1>w
=
CG2>w
Cs2>w
= 3
2
? 0 (6)
CG1>w
Cs2>w
=
CG2>w
Cs1>w
=
1
2
A 0 (7)
Notice that, in absence of any regulating policy, the strategic pricing decision
by the duopolists in either period does not aect in any extent the proÞts
within the other period, and can therefore be seen as separate solution to an
identical program max
sl
l>w = sl>wGl>w, with l = 1> 2, and w = 1> 2. In fact, the
equilibrium prices at any stage of the repeated game are the same and the Þrst
order conditions are characterized by,
C1>w
Cs1>w
= s1>w
CG1>w
Cs1>w
+G1>w = 0 (8)
C1>w
Cs2>w
= s2>w
CG2>w
Cs2>w
+G2>w = 0 (9)
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solving these conditions with respect to prices we obtain the pure strategies
Nash Equilibrium prices,
s1>w = s2>w = s =
+ 2n
5
(10)
where  = {2  {1 A 0.
The equilibrium prices are increasing with the distance between Þrms .
Intuitively, higher  translate greater degrees of product dierentiation and,
consequently, stronger market power for both Þrms leading to higher equilibrium
prices.
3 Reference Pricing
We now consider a version of the above model where Reference Pricing is intro-
duced as a reimbursement scheme. In countries, such as Germany and Spain,
where pharmaceuticals are reimbursed through a reference pricing system, pa-
tients are typically reimbursed a lump sum amount su for any homogeneous
pharmaceutical cluster, independently of the drug variety bought.
It has been often argued that the reference pricing is delivering not only
correct incentives to competing Þrms but also eective mechanisms to control
pharmaceutical expenditure. Here we show that it may, however, facilitate
pricing behavior by the Þrms in the pharmaceutical market.
Despite of the wide range of reference pricing policies2 , the basics of its
workings can be generalized in the following expressions
li sl ? su Sf = fsl
li sl A su Sf = sl  su + fsl
If a drug price (sl) is lower than the reference price (su) level, then the
amount paid by the consumer (Sf) is a proportion of the drug price given by
the co-payment rate (f) times the drug price (fsl). For reimbursement systems
that do not contemplate co-payments, the consumer pays nothing (Sf = 0).
Otherwise, for drug prices (sl) higher than the reference price (su) level, the
amount paid by the consumer equals the dierence between the price and the
reference price level plus a proportion of the drug price given by the co-payment
rate (f) times the drug price (fsl). For reimbursement systems that do not
contemplate co-payments, the consumer pays simply the extra amount above
the reference price level (sl  su).
Given that the role of reference is translated by a demand eect consisting
of the subtraction of a constant term on the utility function and that, even if
the two policies coexist, the marginal impact of one is not aected by the other,
in the study of the relative incentives for pricing behavior of reference pricing in
2For a complete exposition on the characteristics of this policy in dierent countries consult
Lopez-Casasnovas and Jonsson (2001)
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comparison to co-payment policies it su!ces to develop two frameworks (one for
each policy) having as status quo no reimbursement policy and then compare
the optimal pricing strategies after the implementation of each policy.
Therefore, in our analysis we will study two scenarios, both characterized
by the inexistence of any public reimbursement policy in the Þrst period and its
introduction in the beginning of the second period, before pricing strategies are
taken by the pharmaceutical Þrms.
Before describing the model in detail, it may be worthwhile to remind how
a reference pricing reimbursement scheme would work. Depending on the mar-
ket price level relatively to the reference price level the impact of reimbursing
consumers through a reference pricing policy will dier. If both drug prices are
higher than the reference price level, then, introducing at some point w such
a policy mainly aects consumers demand, by allowing consumers that previ-
ously were not buying any drug to start buying. In other words, for any given
level of the instant utility from treatment, the locations of the above deÞned
marginal customers are clearly shifted "outward" by the amount of the reference
price, while the location of the consumer indierent between two drug varieties
remains unaected. If Þrms pricing strategies are such that charged prices are
lower than the reference price level, then the amount Þnanced by the third party
payer is just enough to cover that price and, thus, the location of the marginal
consumers does not depend neither on the reference price level nor on the drug
market price. Finally, if only one Þrm, say Þrm 1 (Þrm 2), prices at a higher
level than the reference price, the location of the consumer indierent between
consuming the competitors drug {2 ({1) or opting out from the market will not
depend neither on market prices nor on the reference price level. The location of
the consumer indierent between the two drugs will shift to the left (right) with
an increase of the reference price while the location of the consumer indierent
between consuming the drug of the competitor and not buying any drug at all
shifts right (left), i.e., at the same market price, more consumers are willing to
buy the competitors drug. The impact on proÞts will follow accordingly to the
eects on demand.
Indeed, the consumers utility from consuming drug {l sold at price bsland
reimbursed a lump sum amount bsu whenever bsl A bsu is given by,
X(};{l) =
½
n  (bsl  bsu) |}  {l| for bsl A bsu
n  |}  {l| for bsl  bsu (11)
for l = 1> 2 while the utility from no drug consumption remains the same:
X(}; 0) = 0= Therefore, the marginal consumers are now given by,
For bs1 A bsuand bs2 A bsu
b}1 = bs1 + {1  n  bsub} = } = (bs2  bs1) + ({1 + {2)
2b}4 = n + bsu + {2  bs2
8
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For bs1  bsu and bs2 A bsu
b}1 = {1  nb} = } = (bs2  bsu) + ({1 + {2)
2b}4 = n + bsu + {2  bs2
For bs1 A bsu and bs2  bsu
b}1 = bs1 + {1  n  bsub} = } = (bsu  bs1) + ({1 + {2)
2b}4 = n + {2
For bs1  bsu and bs2  bsu
b}1 = {1  nb} = } = ({1 + {2)
2b}4 = n + {2
As a consequence, depending on Þrms pricing strategies, the total demand
in that period will be aected or not by the reimbursement scheme, becoming
Gw =
?}4wZ
?}1w
i (}) g} with G1>w =
?}wZ
?}1w
i (}) g} being served by Þrm 1 and the remaining
G2>w =
?}4wZ
?}w
i (}) g} consumers by Þrm 2. With } uniformly distributed on the
support [0> 1], both Þrms demand will be characterized by,
Gl>2 =
;
AAAAAAAA?
AAAAAAAA=
?sl>23?sl>2++2n
2 + bsu ½ bsl A bsubsl A bsu
2n++?sl>2?su
2
½ bsl  bsubsl A bsu
2n+3?su3?sl>2+
2
½ bsl A bsubsl  bsu
+2n
2
½ bsl  bsubsl  bsu
for l = 1> 2 (12)
Where bsl is the competitor pricing strategy.
As we can observe from the above demand function we have that if both
Þrms price at a higher level than the reference price then the eect of the latter
consists of boosting demand for both Þrms. If both Þrms price at a lower level
9
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than the reference price, the reference price will not have any eect on demand.
And, Þnally, if one Þrm prices at a higher level than the reference price while the
competitor at a lower level, then reference price will shift outwards (inwards)
the demand of the latter (former). Graphically, and for Þrms prices higher than
the reference pricing level,
0      z1 z’1 x1 z*          x2 z’4 z4 1
k+pr
k+p’r
A shift on reference pricing from su to s0u for sl A su for l = 1> 2
3.1 Timing
We consider a two-stage game. In the Þrst stage, the two pharmaceutical Þrms,
in absence of any reimbursement scheme and located at an exogenous distance 
on the unit interval, compete by simultaneously and non-cooperatively setting
the price for their own drug variety. The characteristics of the consumers and
the demand are the ones described in the previous section.
At the beginning of the second stage, the government observes the prices
{bs1>1> bs2>1} as set up by the Þrms at the Þrst stage, and Þxes a reference pricebsu according to a particular function bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1) which is common knowledge.
In the second period, given such a reference price, the two Þrms compete anew
by setting simultaneously and independently the prices for their drug varietiesbs1>1> bs2>1.
Clearly, because of the introduction of the reference price policy, Þrms proÞts
in the last stage will depend on the previous period pricing strategies via the
impact of reference pricing on the demand function. In fact, the latter is now
depending not only on the pricing strategies in the last stage, but also on the
reference price:
G1>2 = i(bs1>2> bs2>2> bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1)) (13)
Therefore, as the reference pricing function bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1) is in fact common
knowledge, the rational Þrms would be able to anticipate the eects of their de-
10
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cisions at the Þrst period on the subsequent stage, and they would consequently
optimize taking the latter into account.
Being bsl the drug price of Þrm l, f the marginal cost of producing the drug
standardized to zero,  5 [0> 1] is the common discount factor, l>w the proÞt
gained by Þrm l at stage w, and Gl the demand faced by Þrm l, the present
discount values of all future proÞts for the duopolists are given by
SGY1>1 = 1>1 + 1>2
= bs1>wG1>1(bs1>1> bs2>1) + bs1>2 (14)
G1>2(bs1>2> bs2>2> bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1)) (15)
and, analogously for Þrm 2,
SGY2>1 = 2>1 + 2>2
= bs2>wG2>1(bs1>1> bs2>1) + bs2>2 (16)
G2>2(bs1>2> bs2>2> bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1)) (17)
Therefore, we will now solve, backwards, the dynamic Þnite game looking
for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. First we will investigate, for any level
of the reference pricing, the Nash equilibria of the pricing game at the last
stage. Then, we will go back to the Þrst period to identify which price would be
selected by any duopolist in order to maximize its own discount value of future
earnings, thus also taking into account the eects on the equilibrium value of
the reference price.
3.2 Last Stage
In this stage, given the level of reference price bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1) as previously deter-
mined by the government, the Þrms compete simultaneously in prices in order
to maximize their own proÞt in the second period only. Being bsl the drug price
of Þrm l (with l = 1> 2) and Gl the demand faced by Þrm l, the duopolists proÞt
functions at the last period l are given by
l>2 = bsl>2Gl>2(bsl>2> bsl>2> bsu (bsl>1> bsl>1)) l = 1> 2 (18)
Given that the demand is given by four tiers according to (12) also proÞts will
be. Therefore, one must study what happens for both cases {bsl>2  su>;bsl>2}
and {bsl>2 A bsu> ;bsl>2} for l = 1> 2= Suppose that Þrm l sets a price such thatbsl>2  bsu. If that is the case demand will not depend on the Þrm, own, pricing
strategies indeed it is given by,
Gl =
2n ++ bsl>2  bsu
2
li bsl>2 A bsu
Gl =
+ 2n
2
li bsl>2  bsu
11
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The proÞt function of Þrm l is, then, given by,
l>2 = bsl>2Gl>2(> n; bsl>2) li bsl>2 A bsu
l>2 = bsl>2Gl>2(> n) li bsl>2  bsu
Maximizing with respect to prices, the Þrst order conditions are then given by
Cl>2
Cbsl>2 = Gl>2(> n; bsl>2) A 0 ;bsl>2> l = 1> 2
Consequently, in the optimum, bsl>2 $ +4. Therefore, the condition for which
this optimum is deÞned bsl>2  bsu is violated, i.e., for every reference price value it
is always optimal to price above it3 . By symmetry, the same reasoning applies to
the competitor. Therefore we can focus our analysis for the case where bsl>2 A bsu
with l = 1> 2.
Maximizing proÞts with respect to bs1>2 and bs2>2 the Þrst order conditions
are given respectively by,
C1>2
Cbs1>2 = bsl2 CG1>2Cbsl2 +Gl2 = 0 (19)
C2>2
Cbs2>2 = bsl2 CG2>2Cbs2>2 +Gm2 = 0 (20)
For bsl>2 A bsu, it is immediately reckoned that the Nash Equilibrium prices of the
second stage will be superior to the ones found in the previous model without
reference pricing. In fact, for the left hand side of the above conditions being
larger under a reference price policy than in the case where bsu = 0, it only
needs to hold that the demand is indeed increasing with the reference pricing,
CGl2
C?su A 0 (
CGl2
C?su A 0), which is always true as,
G1>2 = b}  b}1 = bs2>2  3bs1>2 ++ 2n
2
+ bsu (21)
G2>2 = b}4  b} = bs1>2  3bs2>2 ++ 2n
2
+ bsu (22)
where, again,  = {2  {1 A 0. Analytically, given that the introduction of
reference pricing corresponds to a positive linear transformation of the (concave)
proÞt function, the global maximum of the new function is higher than the
analogous of the initial proÞt function.
In fact, solving the system of two equations, the equilibrium pricing strategies
are found to be4
3Given that this analysis applies to the remaining dierent scenarios of the paper we will
through out omit it and simply analyse the existence of second stage equilibrium for proÞt
functions deÞned for prices ?sp>w=2 A ?su with p = l> m
4This optimum is valid for ?sp>w=2 A ?su, i.e., for ?su ? F3 . Given that ?su =
min {?sl>w=1> ?sm>w=1} as ?sWl>w=1 = ?sWm>w=1 = sW then ?su = sW = {+2n5 =
F
5
=i ?su ? F
3
is
always true.
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bs1>2 = bs2>2 = + 2n + 2 bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1)5
As expected, equilibrium prices are increasing in the reservation and refer-
ence prices as well as on product heterogeneity (given by the distance between
the two drugs locations ).
Comparing these price levels (bs1>2> bs2>2) with the ones arising from the game
without reference pricing (s) we have,
bs1>2  s = bs2>2  s = 25 bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1) A 0
That is, with the introduction of reference pricing Þrms price at a higher level
in the last stage (2).
3.3 First Stage
By moving backwards, we now investigate Þrms optimal strategies in the Þrst
stage. As mentioned above, knowing the way its pricing strategies are aecting
the second stage pricing, each Þrm will choose such a price to maximize its own
present discount value of both current and future proÞts, that is, the individual
optimizing behavior is to,
max
?s1>1
SGY1>1 = (23)
= bs1>wG1>1(bs1>1> bs2>1) + bs1>2G1>2(bs1>2> bs2>2> bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1))
for Þrm 1, and to
max
?s2>1
SGY2>1 = (24)
= bs2>wG1>1(bs1>1> bs2>1) + bs2>2G1>2(bs1>2> bs2>2> bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1))
for Þrm 2, where  5 [0> 1] is the common discount factor.
Plugging in the expressions for the second stage equilibrium prices bs1>2 =bs2>2 = +2n+2?su(?s1>1>?s2>1)5 , and maximizing with respect to (bs1>1> bs2>1) the equi-
librium is described by the following Þrst order conditions,
CSGY1>1
Cbs1>1 = bs1>1 CG1>1Cbs1>1 +G1>1 + bs1>2 C bsuCbs1>1
"
CG1>2
Cbs2>2 Cbs

2>2
C bsu + CG1>2C bsu
#
= 0
Analogously, for Þrm 2,
CSGY2>1
Cbs2>1 = bs2>1 CG2>1Cbs2>1 +G2>1 + bs2>2 C bsuCbs2>1
"
CG2>2
Cbs1>2 Cbs

1>2
C bsu + CG2>2C bsu
#
= 0
From the latter conditions, we can thus state the following result.
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Proposition 1 For C?suC?s1>1  0 and
C?su
C?s2>1  0 the Nash Equilibrium prices level
is at least as high as the equilibrium prices arising in the above game without
reference pricing.
Proof. In fact, by comparing the Þrst order condition, say for Þrm 1, with the
analogous one for the model without reference pricing, an extra term may be
observed, given by
1 = bs1>2 C bsuCbs1>1
"
CG1>2
Cbs2>2 Cbs

2>2
C bsu + CG1>2C bsu
#
This term reßects the impact of todays pricing strategies on tomorrow proÞts.
As, from the discussion above,
CG1>2
C?s2>2 A 0,
C?s2>2
C?suw=2
 0, CG1>2C?suw=2 A 0, and
C?suw=2
C?s1>1 
0 it is promptly reckoned that 1  0. Therefore, since the introduction of
reference pricing is translated into a linear positive increasing transformation
of the (concave) proÞt function, the optimal strategy by any Þrm necessarily
implies to set up a greater or equal equilibrium price level than the corresponding
one for the game with no reference pricing.
The latter analysis, provides a Þrst insight on the eect of reference price
policies upon the duopolists behavior previous to its introduction: in order to
aect the coming regulation policy, Þrms may have incentives to charge higher
prices.
3.4 Dierent reference price policies
In order to shed some brighter light on the impact of reference pricing on Þrms
incentives, however, we need to specify in greater detail the exact functional form
of bsu (bs1>1> bs2>1), according to which the reference price is, actually, computed,
by the third party payer, as a function of the observed pricing strategies.
Here we investigate two main speciÞc adaptive rules corresponding to the
ones that have mostly been adopted by policy makers in the last years. Indeed,
several countries (such as Australia, British Columbia and New Zealand) have
opted for setting a reference price at a level of the lowest observed price actually
charged by Þrms in the past.
Other countries (such as Germany and the Netherlands), on the other hand,
have, instead, opted for taking into account all the distribution of prices charged
by Þrms in the previous period, for instance, by computing an index linearly
combining any observed prices.
While the latter may be regarded as a more informative adaptive rule, the
interesting feature of the former policy seems to also hinge on the di!culties in
the equilibrium computation caused by the inevitable discontinuity in the proÞt
functions.
Min case: bsuw = min {bs1>w1> bs2>w1} We start investigating the case where
the regulatory policy consists of setting a reference price at the level of the
lowest observed price in the last period: bsuw = min {bs1>w1> bs2>w1}.
14
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The identiÞcation of the Nash equilibrium pricing strategies in such a case
is hindered by the fact that a Þrms payo is not a continuous function of its
own charged price, depending, at the contrary, on which price is the minimum.
Nevertheless, we are able to show that the two-stage game has indeed a unique
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium.
In fact, for any level of the reference price bsu = min {bs1>1> bs2>1}, the equi-
librium prices at the second stage are uniquely determined as the symmetric
strategies, bsl>2 = + 2n + 2min {bs1>1> bs2>1}5
with l = 1> 2, and  = {2  {1 A 0. Therefore, Þrms price above the price level
arising under a scenario without reference pricing.
Then, deÞne, as above, s = +2n5 as the symmetric equilibrium price in
the absence of reference pricing, F as a strictly positive expression standing for
 + 2n, and % an inÞnitesimal positive amount. Therefore, we will now show
the following result,
Proposition 2 The pair of symmetric pricing strategies
l = bsl>1 = s; bsl>2 = + 2n + 2 bsu5 > l = 1> 2
represents the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the two-stage pricing
game with reference price of the type bsuw = min {bs1>w1> bs2>w1}.
Proof. In fact, lets start by assuming that Þrm 2 pricing optimal strategy
coincides with the equilibrium price in the absence of reference pricing: bs2>1 =
s = +2n5 . To study Þrms 1 optimal response pricing strategies, we may start
asking whether there would be any proÞtable deviations from also charging the
same price level bs1>1 = s = +2n5 . Denote by SGY 1 Þrms 1 present discount
value of proÞts stream when pricing at bs1>1 = s, s will be a best response at
the Þrst stage to 2s strategy if and only if
SGY 1 A SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s±%
with % being a positive, though possibly inÞnitesimal, amount. As a matter of
fact, by computing the dierence on the discount values it turns out that they
are, indeed, strictly positive in both directions:
SGY 1  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s+% =
3
2
%2 A 0
SGY 1  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s% = %
2
µ
3
2
 6
25

¶
+
+% 42
125
(+ 2n) A 0
Given the symmetry of such a game, the same line of reasoning is then holding
for Þrm 2. This implies that we have in fact proved that the pair of symmetric
15
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strategies (bsl>1> bsl>2) = (+2n5 > +2n+2?su5 ), with l = 1> 2, is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in the two-stages pricing game.
However, we still need to show that
l =
µbsl>1 = + 2n5 ; bsl>2 = + 2n + 2 bsu5
¶
for l = 1> 2, is the unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
We then control whether any pair l =
³bsl>1 = s ± {; bsl>2 = +2n+2?su5 ´, l =
1> 2 is a SPN equilibrium. To see it, suppose that, at the Þrst stage, Þrm 2 Þxes
a price bs2>1 = s+{. Now, taking as given such a price charged by 2, it is clearly
not an optimal response by Þrm 1 to charge any price above bs2>1 = s + {. In
fact, by doing so it would suer losses compared to the earnings gained by also
pricing an identical bs1>1 = s + {, as
dSGY 1 ¯¯?s1>1=s+{  SGY 01 ¯¯¯s01>1=s+{+% = 32%2 + 52{% A 0
Nevertheless, one could argue that it still might be optimal for Þrm 1 to undercut
Þrm 2 price. Indeed, by direct computation, it turns out that, there exists an
% for which deviating from charging a symmetric price bs1>1 = s + { to a lower
one is proÞtable. In fact,
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s+{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s+{% = %
2
µ
3
2
 16
25

¶
+ {%
µ
32
25
  5
2
¶
+
+% 87
125
(+ 2n)
for  5 [0> 1], is so that
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s+{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s+{% A 0 for % A
625{ 174F  320{
5 (75 32)
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s+{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s+{% ? 0 for % ?
625{ 174F  320{
5 (75 32)
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s+{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s+{% = 0 for % =
625{ 174F  320{
5 (75 32)
Then, in the Þrst case there exists a % A 0 such that it is proÞtable to undercut
any bs2>1 = s + {. Therefore any pair of strategies
l =
µbsl>1 = + 2n5 + {; bsl>2 = + 2n + 2 bsu5
¶
can never be a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Suppose now that, at the Þrst stage, Þrm 2 Þxes a price bs2>1 = s  {
with { A 0. Now, taking as given such a price charged by 2, it is clearly not
an optimal response by Þrm 1 to charge any price above bs2>1 = s  {, i.e.,
16
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bs2>1 = s  {+ % for % A 0. In fact, by doing so it would suer losses compared
to the earnings gained by also pricing an identical bs1>1 = s  {, as
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s{+% = %
2
µ
3
2
 6
25

¶
+ {%
µ
5
2
 12
25

¶
+
+% 42
125
(+ 2n)
for any % A 0>
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s{+% A 0
Nevertheless, one could argue that it still might be optimal for Þrm 1 to undercut
Þrm 2 price. Indeed, by direct computation, it turns out that, there exists an
% for which deviating from charging a symmetric price bs1>1 = s  { to a lower
one, bs2>1 = s  { %, is proÞtable. In fact,
SGY1
¯¯
?s1>1=s{  SGY 01
¯¯¯
s0
1>1=s{% =
3
2
%2  5
2
{%
Therefore, given that 2 is charging a price bs2>1 = s  {, 1s best response is
to charge bs1>1 = s  {  %. Therefore there exists an % A 0 such that it is
proÞtable to undercut any bs2>1 = s  {. Consequently, any pair of strate-
gies l =
³bsl>1 = +2n5  {; bsl>2 = +2n+2?su5 ´ can never be a Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium. This implies that, the symmetric pair of strategies l =³bsl>1 = s; bsl>2 = +2n+2min{?s1>1>?s2>1}5 ´, l = 1> 2, is a unique SPNE.
Intuitively, as both Þrms experience increased proÞts at higher bsu levels and
as the latter is an increasing function of Þrms pricing strategies, Þrms have
an incentive to increase bsu via higher prices. Nevertheless, for dierent pricing
strategies, in this case, only one Þrm is able to in fact aect bsu. For this Þrm
it is then proÞtable to sacriÞce part of todays proÞt in order to attain higher
proÞt tomorrow. This Þrm has an incentive, today, to price at a higher level
than what would prevail in the absence of reference pricing as long as its price
is lower than the competitor´s. Therefore, it will do so until its price reaches
the competitors price. On the other hand, the competitor pricing strategies in
the Þrst period simply aect his Þrst period instantaneous proÞt. Hence, this
Þrm will have no strategical incentive to exchange todays for tomorrows proÞt,
and therefore has no incentive to further increase its price today. Moreover, by
decreasing its price will trigger price competition and, consequently, force the
competitor to decrease its price. Overall, stier competition results in lower
reference price levels and consequently lower demand and proÞt tomorrow.
Second case: bsuw = (1)bs1>w1+bs2>w1 We will now investigate the eect
of an alternative regulatory policy, computing the reference price as a linear
combination of the past observed prices set by the Þrms. The reference price is
now given by a weighed average of drugs prices,
17
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bsuw = (1 )bs1>w1 + bs2>w1
With  5 [0> 1].
Solving backwards, the Nash equilibrium pricing strategies at the second
stage are described by
bs1>2 = bs2>2 = + 2n + 2 [(1 )bs1>1 + bs2>1]5
As before, equilibrium prices are increasing in reference and instant utility
from treatment levels and on the degree of dierentiation between drugs.
Moving to the Þrst period, by direct computation of the Þrst order conditions
it can be seen that the above deÞned extra terms for Þrms 1 and 2 are both
positive,
1>1 A 0
2>1 A 0
that is, the equilibrium prices are expected to always be higher than in the game
without reference pricing. In fact, by maximizing Þrms proÞts with respect to
prices and by solving the Þrst order conditions, it turns out that the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium asymmetric pricing strategies are such that,
bs1>1 = F 482 + 36  72  175
2402 + 144  240  875
= F
12
h
(2  1)2 + 7 (  1)
i
 175
48 [5 (  1) + 3] 875
bs2>1 = F 482  132 + 12  175
2402 + 144  240  875
where F is + 2n=
For low values of  the equilibrium price of drug 1 is increasing with . For
higher levels of  the price of drug 1 is decreasing with . Concerning the price
of drug 2 for su!ciently it is increasing in , ; 5 [0> 1] = The lower the weights
attached to a Þrms price on the reference pricing rule, the lower (higher) the
price of the drug produced by this Þrm (the rival) Moreover, both prices are
increasing with the instant utility from treatment parameter and the degree of
product dierentiation. Indeed, for bsl>1 A 0> l = 1> 2, and given that F A 0
both prices are increasing in F (with F = + 2n). The price of both drugs 1
and 2 is also increasing with . Also this result is intuitive, for higher the values
attached to future proÞts the incentive to sacriÞce todays proÞts, via increased
prices, in order to obtain higher proÞts tomorrow is stronger.
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Therefore the reference price level is given by,
bsu = F 1202  120 + 72 + 175
875 2402  144 + 240
Straight forward computations show that the reference price is increasing in
F and for  5
£
0> 12
¤
it is decreasing with  while for  5
£
1
2 > 1
¤
it is increasing
with .
Plugging into the optimal values found for the second stage price game5 ,
bs1>2 = bs2>2 = 245
875 2402  144 + 240
For  5
£
0> 12
£
second stage prices are increasing with  otherwise, for  5
¤
1
2 > 1
¤
optimal drug prices are decreasing with .
Comparing the Þrst period equilibrium prices with the equilibrium prices
in the game with no regulation we Þnd that even computing reference pricing
in terms of linear combination of past observations leads to higher equilibrium
prices set by the duopolists:
bs1>1  s = 84F (5  6)
5
¡
2402 + 144  240  875
¢ A 0
bs2>1  s =  84F (5 + 1)
5
¡
2402 + 144  240  875
¢ A 0
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, in this case the divergence between the asym-
metric equilibrium prices ultimately depends on the announced weights by which
the policy mechanism is built. In fact, by rewriting such dierence between equi-
librium prices as
bs1>1bs2>1  1 = 84 (2  1)482  132 + 12  175 (25)
it can be seen that the denominator is always negative. Therefore, it always
holds that
bs1>1 A bs2>1 for  5 0> 12

bs1>1 = bs2>1 for  = 12bs1>1 ? bs2>1 for  5 ¸12 > 1
¸
5As the proÞt function for which this optimum was calculated exists for prices higher than
the reference price level, we still need to impose that sp>w=2 A su that is always true for
 ? 35
12(5235+3)
19
Reference pricing v co-payment: Firms' pricing strategies
_________________________________________________________________ 
In other words, both Þrms prices are higher in presence of reference pricing,
but, depending on the value of the weight  upon which the linear combination
rule is computed, their relative (asymmetric) distance could be higher or lower.
In particular, the higher the weight of the reference pricing rule attributed to
a speciÞc Þrms price, the higher its equilibrium price relatively to the com-
petitors. The intuition is clear. In fact, as Þrms proÞts are increasing in the
reference price level and as  measures the impact of Þrm 1 s pricing strategy
on reference pricing, the higher the latter, the more proÞtable it is for Þrm 1 to
sustain higher prices. Contrarily to the outcome of the previous setup, under
this reference pricing formulation both prices have an eect on the level of bsu=
The extent of this inßuence depends on the weight  that basically works as the
"instrument" by which their pricing strategies aect the level of bsu.
Dierent rules comparison Comparing the equilibrium prices obtained un-
der each policy we Þnd that Þrst stage equilibrium prices are always higher when
the reference price level is calculated as an average of observed Þrms prices.
Moreover, while under the Þrst reference pricing rule Þrms price at an identical
level, under the second equilibrium prices dier between Þrms. Therefore, the
reference price level is always lower under the Þrst rule.
On what concerns second period pricing strategies for su!ciently high and
low values of  the Þrst reference price rule leads to lower prices while for inter-
mediate values of  results are ambiguous (depend on consumers preferences,
on the degree of horizontal dierentiation and on the discount factor).
4 Vertical dierentiation
We now introduce product vertical dierentiation by assuming that one of the
drugs has a higher quality relatively to its competitor. Quality can both be in-
terpreted as eective or perceived quality. While the Þrst consists of a product
speciÞcation such as the coating of a pill or the easiness in the drug in-take,
the latter has solely to do with the perception that consumers have of a drug.
Despite the level of similarity between two drugs, due to a more eective mar-
keting, brand loyalty or reputation in the market, one drug might be perceived
as belonging to a higher quality standard than the other. The importance of
such an assumption lies on its ability to better Þt a pharmaceutical market
where both generic and branded drugs coexist.
Consider now the model analyzed before but with one Þrm (1) oering some
quality t while the other (2) does not. t can be seen as perceived quality, with
the Þrm that oers it being the branded Þrm while the other the generic Þrm.
In this set up the utility derived by a consumer located at } from buying
drug l at price sl being reimbursed a lump sum esu, is given by
X(};{l) =
½
n + t  (esl  esu) w |}  {l| for esl A esu
n + t  w |}  {l| for esl  esu
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for l = 1> 2 while the utility from no drug consumption remains the same:
X(}; 0) = 0= Therefore, the marginal consumers are now given by,
For es1 A esu and es2 A esu
e}1 = es1  esu + {1  n  te} = } = (es2  es1) + ({1 + {2) + t
2e}4 = n + {2 + esu  es2
For es1  esu and es2 A esu
e}1 = {1  n  te} = } = (es2  esu) + ({1 + {2) + t
2e}4 = n + esu + {2  es2
For es1 A esu and es2  esu
e}1 = es1 + {1  n  esu  te} = } = ( esu  es1) + ({1 + {2) + t
2e}4 = n + {2
For es1  esu and es2  esu
e}1 = {1  n  te} = } = ({1 + {2) + t
2e}4 = n + {2
At higher quality levels the marginal consumer (e}) indierent between drugs
1 and 2 has a location in the taste space to the right of the previous marginal
consumer. Indeed, higher quality levels increase the degree of (vertical) dier-
entiation between the two drugs rendering the preference of drug 1 relatively
to drug 2 stronger and, consequently, increasing the demand for Þrm 1 and
decreasing the demand for Þrm 2.
Concerning the consumers indierent between buying and not buying, e}1
and e}4, at higher quality levels, consumers switch from not buying any drug
to buying drug 1. On the other hand, as expected, quality has no impact on
the decision between buying drug 2 or not buying any drug at all. That is, a
consumer located at } 5 [0> e}1[ is better o by not buying a drug than buying
any. Consumers located in the interval } 5 ]e}1> e}[ prefer buying Þrms 1 drug
than buying drug 2 or not buying any drug at all. Finally, consumers in the
segment ]e}> e}4[ obtain a higher utility by buying drug two than buying drug
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one or no drug at all. Thus, e}1> e}4 and e} will be the solution of X(}; 0) =
X(};{)> X(}; |) = X(}; 0) and X(}; |) = X(};{) respectively, assuming, without
loss of generality, unitary transportation costs 1. Consequently the demand
functions are given by,
G1>2 =
;
AAAAAAAA?
AAAAAAAA=
?s2>23?s1>2++2n+3t+2?su
2
½ es1>2 A esues2>2 A esu
2n++?s2>2?su+3t
2
½ es1>2  esues2>2 A esu
2n+3?su3?s1>2++3t
2
½ es1>2 A esues2>2  esu
+2n+3t
2
½ es1>2  esues2>2  esu
For Þrm 1, and for Þrm 2
G2>2 =
;
AAAAAAAAA?
AAAAAAAA=
?s1>23?s2>2++2nt+2?su
2
½ es1>2 A esues2>2 A esu
2n++3?su3?s2>2t
2
½ es1>2  esues2>2 A esu
2n+?s1>2?su+t
2
½ es1>2 A esues2>2  esu
+2nt
2
½ es1>2  esues2>2  esu
We will proceed with the analysis for the case es1 A esu and es2 A esu.6 The
introduction of quality increases the demand of the Þrm supplying it , i.e., Þrms
1 demand, while it decreases Þrms 2 demand. Without reference pricing the
equilibrium prices in each stage are given by,
es1>2 = F5 + 1735tes2>2 = F5  335t
Intuitively, vertical product dierentiation confers the Þrm oering quality (
Þrm 1) a higher market power and, thus, allows her to charge higher prices.
Comparing Þrm 1 price with Þrm 2
es1>1es2>1  1 = 147F(875 81) A 0
As es2>w A 0 implies 7F3t A 0 we have that ?s1>1?s2>1 1 A 0= The branded Þrm will
always price higher than the generic Þrm. This result is quite intuitive, indeed,
a positive (perceived) quality level (t A 0) confers some degree of market power
to the branded Þrm what allows for higher mark ups.
6As proven before, there exists no equilibrium caracterized by second stage prices below
the reference price level. So we will proceed our analysis focusing on prices above the reference
price (obviously without constraining the optimization in the search for an equilibrium).
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4.1 Reference Pricing
In line with the previous sections we will now the reproduce the analysis by con-
templating dierent reference pricing policies but otherwise in all-equal frame-
works.
4.1.1 Min case: esuw = min {es1>w1> es2>w1}
We start investigating the case where the regulatory policy consists in setting a
reference price at the level of the lowest observed price in the last period.
With reference pricing, in the second stage Þrms optimal pricing strategies
are7 ,
es1>2 = F5 + 1735t + 25 esues2>2 = F5  335t + 25 esu
with esuw = min {es1>w1> s2>w1}.
In the Þrst stage Þrms maximize the present discount value of the proÞt
stream,
SGY1>1 = es1>1Gl1 + es1>2G1>2 ¡es1>2> esu2¢
With,
esu = min {es1>1> es2>1}
Maximizing with respect to es1>1 and es2>1, the Þrst order conditions are,
CSGY1>1
Ces1>1 = esl1 CG1>1Ces1>1 +G1>1 + es1>2 C esuCes1>1
CG1>2
Ces2>2 Ces2>2C esu + CG1>2C esu
¸
= 0
Analogously, for Þrm 2,
CSGY2>1
Ces2>1 = esm1 CG2>1Ces2>1 +G2>1 + es2>2 C esuCes2>1
CG2>2
Ces1>2 Ces2>2C esu + CG2>2C esu
¸
= 0
Given the reference pricing rule, the Þrst order conditions will depend on the
relation between the two prices.
Suppose that an equilibrium is such that es1>1 ? es2>1, then the reference price
level will be esu2 = es1>1. Given that C?suC?s1>1 = 1, C?suC?s2>1 = 0 the equilibrium prices
must now satisÞed the following conditions,
es1>1 CG1>1Ces1>1 +G1>1es1>2
CG1>2
Ces2>2 Ces2>2C esu + CG1>2C esu
¸
= 0
7Equilibrium valid for ?sm>2 A ?su C F5 3
3
35
t 3 3
5
?su A 0
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es2>1 CG2>1Ces2>1 +G2>1 = 0
Solving for the equilibrium prices,
es1>1 = 204t + 175F + 425t + 84F125 24es2>1 = 62t + 175F  75t  14F125 24
and comparing the two prices,
es1>1  es2>1 = 2 (71t + 250t + 49F)125 24 A 0
we Þnd that the initial assumption is violated, i.e., esl1 A esm1. Indeed, there can
never exist an equilibrium where the Þrm with higher market power conferred
by higher quality (the branded Þrm) prices at a lower level.
Assume now that es1>1 A es2>>1, then the reference price level will be esu = es2>1.
Given that C?suC?s1>1 = 0,
C?su
C?s2>1 = 1 the equilibrium prices must now satisÞed the
following conditions,
es1>1 CG1>1Ces1>1 +G1>1 = 0
es2>1 CG2>1Ces2>1 +G2>1 + es2>2
CG2>2
Ces1>2 Ces2>2C esu + CG2>2C esu
¸
= 0
Solving for the equilibrium prices,
es1>1 = 90t + 175F + 425t  14F125 24es2>1 = 36t + 175F  75t + 84F125 24
and comparing the two prices,
es1>1  es2>1 = 2 (27t + 250t  49F)125 24
we Þnd that the initial assumption, es1>1 A es2>1, is veriÞed, as long as
t A 49F
250 27
Therefore, the reference price level is given by,
esu = 36t + 175F  75t + 84F
125 24
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And the second stage equilibrium prices8 ,
es1>2 = 3325F + 1008F  912t + 1075t35 (125 24)
es2>2 = 3325F + 1008F  432t  1425t35 (125 24)
Again in this case, the result is very intuitive. A su!ciently high (perceived)
quality level, supplied by the branded Þrm, reduces price sensitivity of demand
what allows the Þrm to price higher than she would if the two drugs were
homogeneous in terms of quality.
Comparing the equilibrium prices with the ones in the absence of reference
pricing,
1 = es1>1  es1>1>su=0 = 2 (7F  3t)125 24 A 0
2 = es2>1  es2>1>su=0 = 12 (7F  3t)125 24 A 0
Both Þrms price at a higher level than in the absence of reference pricing. but
Þrm 2 prices relatively higher (with respect to the scenario without reference
price) than Þrm 1. In fact,
esl1  esl1>su=0esm1  esl1>su=0 ? 1
The price dierence is lower for the branded Þrm. This result is related
to the nature of the demand, indeed one can see reference pricing as an extra
incentive for consumption, that is, it will have a positive impact on the number
of consumers that actually opt for buying a drug and not on the decision of which
drug to buy. But this eect is bounded by the number of potential buyers in the
market. If we consider that perceived quality plays the same role, we observe
that the extra consumers the branded Þrm has to gain due to the introduction
of reference price will be less than for the generic Þrm. This price dierence
can also accrue to the fact that, in this scenario, the reference price aects
dierently the Þrms, while it has a positive direct eect on the generic Þrm
pricing strategies in the Þrst stage, the same does not happen for the branded
Þrm.
A further interesting result is that these price gaps are decreasing with the
level of quality, indeed C1@Ct ? 0 and C2@Ct ? 0. Hence, the higher the
dierentiation on quality the lower the incentive for Þrms to price at higher level
with the introduction of reference pricing. Intuitively, given that the reference
price setter is Þrm 2 (the producer of the generic Þrm) the ability to, proÞtably,
8Valid for ?sp>w=2 A ?su. As ?sm>w=2 ? ?sl>w=2 it su!ces to impose the conditions for which
?sm>w=2 A ?su holds, i.e., t A 73F
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increase prices with the introduction of reference pricing is limited by the degree
of product dierentiation. The market power conferred to the Þrm providing
quality limits the role of the rival as reference price setter. Naturally, having
that the reference price setter is solely determined by the pricing strategies of the
latter, the impact of the reference price on the branded drug pricing strategies
is constrained in the same way.
Furthermore, kC2@Ctk A kC1@Ctk = The inverse relation between quality
and the above price gaps is stronger for the generic Þrm, that is to say that
the disincentive of pricing higher in the presence of quality is stronger for the
generic Þrm. Therefore, with vertical dierentiation even a policy where the
reference price is given by the minimum observed price, does generate higher
prices than in the absence of reference pricing.
4.1.2 Average case: esuw = (1 ) es1>w1 + es2>w1
When the reference pricing rule consists of the weighted average of Þrms prices,
proceeding in an equivalent way as in the previous sections, in the second stage
Þrms optimal pricing strategies are given by,
es1>2 = F5 + 1735t + 25 esu (26)es2>2 = F5  335t + 25 esu
with esu = (1 )es1>1 + es2>1=
Plugging this optimum values on Þrms PDV in the Þrst stage and maximiz-
ing with respect to prices, the optimum at this stage is given by,
es1>1 = Dt + bs1>1 with D A 0 (27)es2>1 = Et + bs2>1 with E ? 0
with9 bsl>1 being the equilibrium prices when there is no vertical dierentia-
tion. Hence, as we can observe from the above Þrst stage equilibrium, while the
branded Þrm will price higher when compared with the model without qual-
ity, the generic Þrm will price at a lower level (es1>1 A bs1>1 and es2>1 ? bs2>1 ).
Comparing the two Þrms  pricing strategies, recall, from (25), that,
bs1>1bs2>1  1 = 84 (2  1)482  132 + 12  175 = O
=, bs1>1 = (O+ 1) bs2>1
9With, D = 71431152
23314875+11522236120+16802
35(2402+14432403875) and E =
2304223115223+16802311522+126031860+2625
35(2402+14432403875)
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For  ? 1@2 O A 0 while for  ? 1@2 O A 0. Using the above expression, the
equilibrium prices deÞned on (27), can be written as,
es1>1 = Dt + bs2>1 (1 + O)es2>1 = Et + bs2>1
Comparing the Þrst period pricing strategies of the two Þrms,
es1>1  es2>1 = t (DE) + bs2>1O
Therefore the asymmetry between prices will depend on the reference price
weight attached to Þrm pricing strategies, , and on the level of quality t.
Indeed,
For
;
?
=
 ? 1@2 es1>1 A es2>1
 A 1@2
½ es1>1 A es2>1 t A OED bs2>1es1>1 ? es2>1 t ? OED bs2>1
On what concerns the reference price its level is given by,
esu = bsu + tL
Where 1 = i (> ) = D (1 ) + E10 . The sign of 1 depends on the value of
= Namely, for su!ciently low (high) values of , 1 ? 0 (1 A 0). Contrarily
to the previous scenario, now, given that both Þrms aect the reference price
level, the impact of the pricing strategies is no longer necessarily (negatively)
constrained by the degree of vertical dierentiation. The role of quality on the
level of the reference price will depend on the magnitude of . If the banded Þrm
plays a signiÞcant role on the determination of the reference price level, then the
existence of product dierentiation diminishes the reference price level. Indeed,
for this Þrm esu and t are substitutes in the sense of having similar impacts on
demand and consequently on proÞts. Therefore, the higher the quality level the
lower the scope, and consequently incentives, to increase proÞts via increased
reference prices. That is, the incentive that this Þrm could have to increase Þrst
period prices is justiÞed by increased demand via increased achieved by higher
reference price levels. This incentive becomes smaller at higher levels of quality,
with quality working as a substitute of reference pricing in terms of demand (and
proÞts) eects. On the other hand, if the Þrm with a more determinant role
on the level of the reference price is the generic Þrm, this incentive is increased,
i.e., relatively to what happened to the other Þrm, there is now more scope for
increased proÞts via higher reference prices.
Comparing with the equilibrium prices that would arise in the absence of
reference pricing,
10With ,
L = 2280 + 3500 3 29753 1224 3 840
2
35
?
2402 + 144 3 240 3 875
?
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es1>1  es1>w>su=0 = Ht + I A 0 with I A 0 (28)es2>1  es2>w>su=0 = Jt +K A 0 with K A 0
For both Þrms, branded and generic, the price always exceeds the price in
a set up without reference pricing11 . Indeed, given that the introduction of
reference pricing is equivalent to a positive increasing linear transformation in
each Þrm proÞt function, the optimal price level is increased relatively to the
scenario without reference pricing.
Decomposing the eect of reference pricing on Þrms proÞt stream,
CSGY1
C esu =  Cs1>2C esu G1>2 + es1>2
CG1>2
Ces1>2 Ces1>2C esu + CG1>2Ces2>2 Ces2>2C esu + CG1>2C esu
¸
CSGY2
C esu =  Ces2>2C esu G2>2 + es2>2
CG2>2
Ces2>2 Ces2>2C esu + CG2>2Ces1>2 Ces1>2C esu + CG2>2C esu
¸
we observe that an increase in the reference price level has two eects. First
it increases prices in the last stage, indeed from (26) we can see that
C?s1>2
C?su A 0.
Even though this eect is the same for both Þrms, the total impact on proÞts of
this eect on prices depends on the magnitude of the demand of each Þrm, that
is a function of quality, reference and reservation prices and location variables.
Firms demand diers due to quality dierentiation and, consequently, prices.
The second eect stands for the impact of reference price on demand. This eect
can be decomposed in two sub-eects: (a) the impact of reference pricing on
demand via increased prices for both Þrms and (b) the direct eect of reference
price on the demand. The total impact of these eects on Þrms proÞts depends
on the equilibrium prices that dier between Þrms due to dierences in location
and quality.
One interesting point for the analysis of Þrms optimal pricing strategies is
how these eects vary with quality. An increase in quality increases demand
for Þrm 1 and decreases demand for Þrm 2= Hence it ampliÞes the Þrst eect
for Þrm 1 but decreases it for Þrm 2. Finally, because the amplitude of the
remaining eects depends on the Þrm pricing strategies, an increase in quality
11With,
H =
312
?
7143 962 + 963 + 2002 3 935
?
35 (3875 + 144 + 240 ( 3 1))
I = 84F (5 3 6)
5 (3875 + 144 + 240 ( 3 1)) A 0
J =
312
?
119 + 96 ( 3 1)2 3 2002 3 45
?
35 (3875 + 144 + 240 ( 3 1))
K = 3 84F (5 + 1)
5 (3875 + 144 + 240 ( 3 1)) A 0
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increases the price charged by Þrm 1 while it decreases the price charged by
Þrm 2. Therefore, given that
CG1>2
C?s1>2
C?s1>2
C?su +
CG1>2
C?s2>2
C?s2>2
C?su +
CG1>2
C?su A 0, an increase
in quality ampliÞes the positive total eect of reference price on demand. For
Þrm 2, given that
CG2>2
C?s2>2
C?s2>2
C?su +
CG2>2
C?s1>2
C?s1>2
C?su +
CG2>2
C?su A 0 and
C?s2>2
Ct ? 0 an increase
in quality diminishes the positive impact of reference pricing on proÞts. Hence,
depending on the magnitude of the eects described above, the overall eect of
the introduction of reference price depends not only on the reference price itself
but also on the quality level.
Going one step further, the role of quality on the impact of reference price
on Þrms optimal pricing strategies depends on the reference price formulation,
namely on the parameter . The two polar cases arise when  = 0 and  = 1,
with the former being equivalent to the previously analyzed min case while the
latter to a scenario where the reference price is given by the highest drug price
in the market. For  = 1, the gap between prices with and without reference
pricing decreases with quality. With quality dierentiation the increase in prices
due to the implementation of the reference price policy is reduced, mirroring
the results found in the previous section. Intuitively, as  $ 1 the "reference
price setter" is Þrm 2, with Þrm 1 pricing strategies playing no role in the
determination of the reference price level. In order to increase reference price,
and consequently proÞts, Þrm 2 has to price at higher levels. Nevertheless,
due to vertical dierentiation, its ability to proÞtably raise its price is limited.
Given that this hurdle arises on the market power conferred to Þrm 1 due to
product dierentiation, it is exarcebated by an increase in quality. For  = 0,
the existence of quality dierentiation strengthens the positive eect on prices
after the introduction of reference pricing. If in the set up without quality Þrms
would price higher than without reference pricing, in this set up this eect is
even higher due to quality. Given that the reference price setter is now the Þrm
with quality advantage, the competition pressure is now weaker allowing higher
prices. In a sense, increasing the price of a drug will have two eects: income
and substitution eect. The Þrm that increases its price will, ceteris paribus,
face less demand today due to consumers that switch to the competitor drug
but will see its demand increased next period due to an income eect. While the
income eect aects equally both Þrms, the substitution eect is stronger for
Þrm 1. Moreover the higher the degree of vertical dierentiation the higher the
negative impact on Þrms j demand due to the substitution eect. Therefore, if
this Þrm is the reference price setter, the (positive) impact of reference price on
market prices is weaker.
5 Discussion
With the above exposition we have concluded that the introduction of reference
pricing does lead to higher prices. Without wanting to go deeper into the
formalization of the mechanism by which it happens, we would like though to
further comment it. Firms pricing behavior can be attributed to two factors.
The Þrst concerns the formulation of the reference price level, namely the fact
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that it is built upon Þrms pricing strategies and consequently is endogenous
to Þrms actions. The crucial fact that makes this endogeneity relevant is an
"anticipation factor", i.e., the fact that each period reference price level is a
function of the previous period pricing strategies. This is what allows Þrms to, in
the Þrst period, revise their pricing strategies adapting to the new institutional
environment and consequently jeopardizing the envisioned goals of the policy.
If this was the only factor behind pricing behavior it would be easy to tackle.
Nevertheless, there is a second factor that facilitates higher pricing behavior
that is the fact that reference price works as a lower bound on pricing strategies
that allows Þrms to set higher prices. This eect can be easily isolated by
analyzing the equilibrium pricing strategies in a set up with reference pricing but
where one period prices does not aect other periods proÞts. Indeed, computing
the Nash Equilibrium of such one shot game, the optimal pricing strategies is
characterized by,
s1 = s2 =
+ 2n + 2su
5
As we can observe from the equilibria described above and comparing it with
Þrms pricing strategies in the absence of reference pricing , with the introduction
of this policy, Þrms price at higher levels, indeed, under both scenarios we have
that the equilibria is characterized by prices above the optimal level in the
absence of reference pricing. More crucially, we Þnd that, for some parameter
conÞgurations, the reference pricing level works as a lower bound on Þrms
optimal pricing strategies.
Finally by analyzing Þrst period pricing strategies, we observe that even
though the reference pricing policy has not yet been introduced, Þrms do increase
prices in order to experience higher proÞts in the coming periods, fact that is
consistent with the "anticipation factor" described above.
6 Conclusions
Within a horizontally dierentiation model, we analyze the eects of reference
pricing reimbursement on Þrms pricing strategies. With this analysis we Þnd
inherent incentives for Þrms pricing behavior, and consequently we shed some
light on time consistency of such policy.
In a Þrst instance we consider a market served by two identical Þrms that
compete in prices in a two stage non cooperative game, having that a reference
pricing policy is announced in the beginning of the Þrst period to be introduced
after Þrms having decided on optimal strategies in the Þrst stage but before
they compete in the second stage
Finally, within the same set-up we allow for quality dierences in order to
capture competition between generic and branded drugs. The same analysis
is developed but this time with one Þrm providing (exogenously) some quality
while the other no quality.
In both set ups we study two particular reference price rules. Namely, the
Þrst analyzed is one where the reference price level in any period is given by
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the minimum observed price in the previous period. The second rule consists of
setting the reference price level in any period as the weighed average of Þrms
prices in the previous period.
We Þnd that the introduction of reference pricing policy in a scenario with-
out vertical dierentiation may lead to higher, rather than lower, prices. This
is always true after the introduction of reference pricing as, for any reference
pricing rule, the observed prices are consistently higher than in the absence of
regulation. Thus, the original envisaged aim of the policy is completely jeopar-
dized.
Also, due to the fact that Þrms correctly anticipate that the forthcoming ref-
erence pricing is, in fact, computed based on their own present pricing strategies,
they immediately realize that they can aect its level, and, therefore, increase
their future demand.
In particular, while the "minimum policy" would imply that the Þrms are not
able to coordinate on higher prices like they would in the absence of reference
price, on the contrary, the "linear policy" implicitly provides a coordination
device. In fact, in such a case the equilibrium pricing behavior in the period
before the introduction of reference pricing is such that both Þrms sustain higher
prices than in the absence of regulation. Therefore, if the regulator deals with a
symmetric market, in order to avoid higher prices, he should implement a policy
where the reference pricing consists of the minimum observed price.
When there is vertical dierentiation the results are somehow dierent. This
case is particularly interesting as by allowing for dierent (perceived) qualities
it better describes a reality where both branded and generic drugs are sold in
the market.
If quality dierentiation is introduced in the market, not only the pricing
behavior in the last period leads to higher prices than in the absence of regulation
for both Þrms (although their pricing strategies are asymmetric), but, more
crucially, both the minimum and linear policies unambiguously imply higher
prices also in the Þrst period.
Within a horizontally dierentiation model, we analyze the eects of refer-
ence pricing reimbursement on Þrms pricing strategies. With this analysis we
Þnd inherent incentives for non-cooperative pricing behavior between Þrms, and
consequently we shed some light on time consistency of such policy.
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